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EXPRESSIVE MINIMALISM AND FUZZY SIGNALS: THE
JUDICIARY AND THE ROLE OF LAW
MICHELE GOODWIN*
The majority impliedly [find] three "reasons to doubt" that Moore re-
tained a sufficient ownership interest in his cells ... The majority's first
reason is that "no reported judicial decision supports Moore's claim, ei-
ther directly or by close analogy." Neither, however, is there any re-
ported decision rejecting such a claim. The issue is as new as its
source-the recent explosive growth in the commercialization of bio-
technology.
-Justice Moskl
The present decision, it may well be apprehended, will not only stimulate
aggressions, more or less brutal and irritating, upon the admitted rights
of colored citizens, but will encourage the belief that it is possible, by
means of state enactments, to defeat the beneficent purposes which the
people of the United States had in view when they adopted the recent
amendments of the constitution, by one of which the blacks of this coun-
try were made citizens of the United States and of the states in which
they respectively reside, and whose privileges and immunities, as citi-




Over sixty years ago, Judge Charles Clark wrote that the function of
courts "cannot be limited to a mere blind adherence to precedent."' 3 He
* Everett Fraser Professor of Law, and Professor of Medicine and Public Health, University of
Minnesota. I am especially grateful to Lori Andrews for convening this important symposium and
pushing participants to think beyond traditional definitions of life and encouraging authors to meet the
challenges of responding to the intersection of law, biotechnology and society. I am also grateful to
Sarah Malkerson for outstanding research assistance. This essay builds on a previous work that ex-
amines formalism in the judicial context. See Michele Goodwin, Formalism and the Legal Status of
Body Parts, 2006 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317. This essay evolves the theoretical framework presented in
Formalism to explore the tensions that arise from excessive formalism, including the "fuzzy signaling"
that distorts any clear messages from courts to legislative bodies. The cases and studies presented are
largely consistent with the previous work.
1. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 506 (Cal. 1990) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
2. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 560 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
3. Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. Walsh, 139 F.2d 809, 814 (2d Cir. 1943). See also BENJAMIN N.
CARDozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 56-80 (1924) (charting the evolution of decision-making from
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cautioned fellow jurists against what scholar Martha Nussbaum might refer
to as "lofty formalism."' 4 Clark warned that judges should avoid clinging to
precedent simply for the sake of it and "artfully" dodging new doctrine. 5
Clark recognized the value of judges fully exercising their mental powers
and "discovering and applying" new trends in law as the technology and
policies of the time demanded. 6 Clark's pragmatic advice to his colleagues
on the bench remains timeless.
To be sure, the burden of crafting judicial responses to nascent tech-
nology is a formidable process. Courts not only struggled with what the
differences between horse/buggy and car/train meant in the application of
tort law, but also in contract, and even property law. Most importantly
judges defined what those assignations would mean for people harmed by
the technology. Judges were not blind to the economic dynamics of tech-
nology nor the political landmines associated with allowing tort law to
serve as a social insurance of sorts to address harms resulting from locomo-
tive technology. 7 As a matter of efficiency, it surely would have been less
time consuming to simply apply the same rules and logic that governed the
use of horses and wooden carts to that of engines, metal, and rubber tires,
but doing so would have been both a mistake and lazy.
Contemporary conflicts in biotechnology mimic those of the locomo-
tive era where science, industry, and the urge of social progress converged
on roads without guardrails and train crossings without lights, whistles, and
signals. The socio-legal questions and problems emanating sexy new tech-
nologies ranging from face transplants, outlandish plastic surgeries (to re-
semble a cat or dog), 8 the capabilities-with the aid of science--to select
pure adherence to precedent to a less rigid and more flexible approach commonly associated with shift
from naturalism to pragmatism).
4. Martha C. Nussbaum, Foreword: Constitutions and Capabilities: "'Perception " Against Lofty
Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2007).
5. Spector, 139 F.2d at 814.
6. Id.
7. As Harlan pointed out in his dissent in Plessy, public opinion may interfere with the courage
of the bench to respond appropriately and meaningfully to the law. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 563 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). When race supremacy, according to Harlan, was the epicenter of U.S. identity, "many
localities [were] dominated by the institution of slavery" and thus it "would not have been safe to do
justice to the black man" and "so far as the rights of blacks were concerned, race prejudice was, practi-
cally, the supreme law of the land." Id.
8. Cat man, Dennis Avner, gained notoriety for countless plastic surgeries to achieve a "cat-like"
appearance. The transformation included having all teeth removed to implant fang-like appendatures.
Dennis Avner, who goes by his Native American name, Stalking Cat, is known around the
world as the Catman. Over the past 25 years, Stalking Cat, 47, has received so many surgical
and cosmetic procedures he's lost count. And he says all of them - from full-face tattoos to
fanged dentures to steel implants for detachable "whiskers" - have been done to achieve
oneness with what he calls his totem, the tiger.
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special traits for embryos, 9 or to become a the mother of septuplets or octu-
plets, 10 urge a reexamination of those challenges which judges confronted
decades ago in the shift from the horse and buggy era to the mechanized
automobile.
Crafting juridical responses to both the ownership of an idea and li-
ability for the harm that the technology causes are not wholly new chal-
lenges; they are the children of the old, more weathered and tested
jurisprudence. During the early decades of the twentieth century, the legis-
lature was not always swift in making legislative adjustments to fit the
unique qualities of automobiles instead of horses on the road. The motiva-
tions for that can perhaps be explained by a legislative bias to promote
industry and encourage the flourishing of technology. But the role of
judges is especially and uniquely different than that of their peers in the
legislature. Judges must be concerned not only with the rule of law, but
also the role of law and the supremacy of reasonable public policy.
Many scholars agree that legislators signal most expressively through
the rules and legislation that they craft. However, the role of judges as
agents of communication may be underappreciated. Not for the fact that
judges are communicators of the law, but the fear of what judicial action
(read sometimes as activism) signifies or destabilizes when they engage in
robust expression. Expectations that judges act as neutral, positivists, bow-
ing to legislative action, and rejecting activism, ignores a profound truth:
Judges are quintessential expressionists, explicating the law, sending sig-
nals, creating new trends, and shaping norms through the behaviors they
seek to modify. It would seem unreasonable to offer that the function of
courts is limited to executing legislative will, without regard to legislative
malfunctions, context, public policy, and the integrity of the bench. The
dangerous tendency in expanding the function of courts is that by means of
judicial interference the democratic process will be undermined and the
See Vanessa Ren~e Casavant, Catman's Transformation Raises Concerns Over Extreme Surgery,
SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 16, 2005, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2002441727_catman
16.html.
9. Dennis R. Cooley, Deaf by Design: A Business Argument Against Engineering Disabled
Offspring, 71 J. Bus. ETHics 209, 211 (2007).
10. The recent birth of octuplets to a mother of six has sparked considerable controversy and is
forcing a dialogue in the medical ethics community. See Meredith Reynolds et al, Trends in Multiple
Births Conceived Using Assisted Reproductive Technology, United States, 1997-2000, 111 Pediatrics
1159 (2003) (suggesting that as "more women delay childbearing into their late 30s and 40s" greater
complications arise and infertility increases. The authors note that among the problems arising with
increased maternal age is "the risk for multiple birth among naturally conceived pregnancies"). Id. at
1159; Stephanie Saul, Birth of Octuplets Puts Focus on Fertility Clinics, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/l 2/health/I 2ivf html.
20091
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
will of the people may be compromised or ignored altogether. Yet, this fear
must not obscure nor dampen the zeal by which judges take to the mish-
mash of rules (if there are any) to interpret and fashion the role of laws.
Judicial actions carry meanings I I but unlike their peers in the legisla-
ture-for better or worse-the wisdom of most judicial opinions is not
always subject to challenges at the ballot box. Certainly, there is no refe-
rendum on how judges should vote in a particular case. The public speaks
to judges through special interest groups who bother to write amicus briefs
that sometimes may be considered by judges, but not always. One could
argue that judges benefit from being shielded from public opinion. 12 Yet,
public attention-and sometimes the need for it-is not lost on judges.
State and local courts can be heavily influenced by politics and increasingly
judicial campaigns rival that of their peers in the legislatures. 13 In 2007,
judges and those campaigning to hold judicial offices spent nearly $35
million on advertising, some of which was so bitter it made national and
international news. 14
Political messages are sent from courts by cases that are not adjudi-
cated. The Supreme Court's decision to grant or deny certiorari sends a
message as to the state of the law or the importance of an underlying dis-
pute. As well, judges signal in their opinions and dissents. Dissenting opi-
nions serve the expressive function of forecasting, leaving some predictions
about the law to come or markers on how to get there.
Justice Harlan's lone and derisive dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson per-
11. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996).
12. In a forthcoming paper, Tom Colby, a scholar at Georgetown Law Center argues that judges
should be more aware of public sentiment and that the public should be engaged in the judicial review
process by submitting materials for judges to consider so that they make well-guided decisions.
13. The politicized nature of judicial elections is highlighted by the 2008 Supreme Court election
in Wisconsin. In what one headline described as "Big money, nasty ads highlight Wisconsin judicial
race," race, small town versus big city experience, political ideology and party loyalty were central to
who would earn a 10 year placement on the state's highest court. In the end, Justice Louis Butler, a
long-time judge and incumbent on the Wisconsin Supreme Court, was unseated by Judge Michael
Gableman after a series of attack ads (some sponsored by third parties) depicting Butler as too lenient
on crime and on the extreme left. The New York Times and Money, Nasty Ads Highlight Wisconsin
Judicial Race, http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/03/3l/wisconsin.judicial.race/ (last visited Feb. 12,
2009).
14. Id. According to the Brennan Center at New York University, the impartiality of courts is at
stake in politically fueled judicial elections. According to authors James Sample, Lauren Jones, and
Rachel Weiss, television ads appeared in ten of eleven states holding contested Supreme Court elections
in 2006. In the report, Sample and his colleagues suggest that judicial elections are now fueled by
partisan politics and special interest groups. JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS 2006: How 2006 WAS THE MOST THREATENING YEAR YET TO THE FAIRNESS AND
IMPARTIALITY OF OUR COURTS-AND How AMERICANS ARE FIGHTING BACK (2007), available at
http://brennan.3cdn .net/49c 1 8b6cb 1 8960b2f9-z6m62gwji.pdf
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fectly signals in this regard. Harlan, himself a former slave owner, warns
the Court, that in the view of the Constitution, and "in the eye of the law,
there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens." 15 As
Harlan omnisciently noted, the opinion by the majority would become
aligned with other pernicious cases, like Dred Scott v. Sanford. 16 The Con-
stitution, as he cautioned, has no room for majoritarian politics masquerad-
ing as state laws that would seek to undermine its most fundamental tenets
and Amendments. Harlan's dissent is courageous for what it meant at the
time and brilliant for what it forecasts and imparts in the soil of constitu-
tional law and Supreme Court jurisprudence. Harlan deftly lays out the
challenge to the majority's holding as he declares that the Constitution is
colorblind, respects civil rights, and that equal protection is a robust doc-
trine, not satisfied by perfunctory, weak accommodations.
The signaling at both ends in Plessy proved transformative, including
the holding itself-that there was only one dissenter became a powerful
artifact of the case. If the Court represents an unfettered moral compass,
then one lone dissent in a case testing the equal protection muscle of the
Constitution signaled that the Fourteenth Amendment would be asleep for a
while. The majority rejected the idea that separate facilities imposed by
Louisiana law translated into a sense of inferiority in blacks in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. But whether blacks would "feel inferior" or
not, was not a constitutional law question. The majority's ruling sent a
message to states that federalism would not be suppressed if legislatures
saw fit to truncate the rights, privileges, and accommodations afforded to
blacks by the Constitution and its Amendments, which emerged out of
rigorous legislative debate. The Constitutional challenge, as Harlan so deft-
ly articulated was that a class of citizens, perceiving themselves as superior,
would assume to "regulate the enjoyment of civil rights, common to all
citizens, upon the basis of race." 17
Not surprisingly, the ruling in Plessy ushered in the Jim Crow era, a
time marked by the dramatic rise in white supremacist organizations
coupled with lynchings and aggressive state legislating to promote segrega-
tionist policies and effectively roll back the Fifteenth Amendment voting
protections. 18 Harlan's apprehensions cannot be overlooked; "[t]he present
15. 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
16. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
17. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 563 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
18. 2500 black men and women were lynched between 1885 and 1900 during Reconstruction. See
Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and Culture, in CRITICAL
WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHND THE MIRROR 170, 171 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds.,
2009]
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decision," he noted, "will not only stimulate aggressions, more or less brut-
al and irritating, upon the admitted rights of colored citizens, but will en-
courage the belief that it is possible, by means of state enactments, to defeat
the beneficent purposes" of the Fourteenth Amendment. 19 Equally, howev-
er, Harlan's dissent proved essential for the democratic process as, half a
century later, blacks rallied around the principles he laid down in Plessy.
The clear signaling from Harlan proved significant then not only for citi-
zens, but also for later courts, like the Court in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, as the language and imagery of a colorblind constitution guided the
jurists.20
There are also times when judges choose to quiet their signals, or en-
gage in expressive minimalism (lest their actions be perceived as activist or
progressive). In those instances, judges may rely on precedent, ignore so-
cial movements and trends, and disregard custom that seemingly conflict
with the rule of law in an effort to demonstrate neutrality or weakly signal
to the legislature. To be sure, there is considerable disagreement on the role
of judges and how expressively they should or should not signal. In his
widely acclaimed book, One Case at a Time, Cass Sunstein21 argues that
judicial minimalism may be a more enlightened approach to juridical deci-
sion-making, because fundamental issues are better resolved though the
1997). That terror escalated during the Jim Crow period. In total, it is estimated that between 1885 and
1951, at least 4700 racially motivated lynchings occurred in the United States. ROBERT L. ZANGRANDO,
THE NAACP CRUSADE AGAINST LYNCHING, 1909-1950 (1980); See, e.g., Leon F. Litwack, Hell-
hounds, in WITHOUT SANCTUARY: LYNCHING PHOTOGRAPHY IN AMERICA 8 (James Allen et al. eds.,
2000); A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 1910-1932 (Herbert
Aptheker ed., 1973); PAULA GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN
ON RACE AND SEX IN AMERICA 113 (1984) (quoting Fannie Barrier Williams that at the turn of the
twentieth century, black women had "no protection against the libelous attacks on their characters, and
no chivalry generous enough to guarantee their safety against man's inhumanity to women."); FROM
LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE: RACE AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA (Charles J. Ogle-
tree, Jr., & Austin Sarat eds., 2006).
19. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
20. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 490 n.5 (1954). The Court embraces the ethic of
Harlan's dissent:
What is this but declaring that the law in the States shall be the same for the black as for the
white; that all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the
States, and, in regard to the colored race, for whose protection the amendment was primarily
designed, that no discrimination shall be made against them by law because of their color?
The words of the amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but they contain a necessary implica-
tion of a positive immunity, or right, most valuable to the colored race-the right to exemp-
tion from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored-exemption from legal
discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the security of their enjoyment
of the rights which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards reducing them
to the condition of a subject race.
Id. (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1880)).
21. CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME (1999).
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democratic process and judges are often unable to anticipate the long-term
consequences of their actions.
Sunstein's analysis is thoroughly compelling, particularly on issues of
social justice. He suggests that Taney and his peers overreached in Dred
Scott, spinning the nation into civil war. To him, the now infamous Dred
Scott opinion would have been a mere footnote or unimportant case in
American jurisprudence had the court not attempted to be the moral com-
pass for the nation. On the other hand, Sunstein suggests that the court
proceeded appropriately when it ruled that the Virginia Military Institute
could not exclude women, but declined to speak to the broader issue of
single-sex institutions. The concern voiced by Sunstein and echoed
throughout the past century by Justice Holmes and other renowned scholars
and jurists alike, is the "possible unreliability of moral judgments from the
court" and the preempting of the judicial process.
But how democratic is the judicial process? With the exception of
elected judges, most people might answer that the judicial process lacks the
democratic values that are typically associated with the legislature. Howev-
er, in his resignation letter from the Supreme Court, Justice Stephen J. Field
articulated a different vision of the Court. To him, the Court was the "most
Democratic" feature of a Republican government. He expounded, "Sena-
tors represent their States, and Representatives their constituents, but this
court stands for the whole country, and as such it is truly 'of the people, by
the people, and for the people.' ' 22 It was in this negative power, which
Field referred to as "the power of resistance," that was the only "safety" of
popular government. 23
The proper role of courts engenders significant debate. Yet, what
seems better settled is the principle that courts are the place at which the
common law is developed. Its genesis and modifications evolve out of the
juridical process and when that process becomes encumbered or deferred to
the legislature the role of the judiciary is called into question. This essay
makes the case that expressive minimalism too often governs the common
law judicial approach to biotechnology. The cases visited in this domain
test our capacity to understand whether life is appropriately described as
being beyond the definition of property, as well as the disputed assump-
tions about life being commodifiable, patentable, destroyable, and con-
22. Talamini v. Allstate Ins. Co., 470 U.S. 1067, 1071 n.9 (1985) (Stevens, Brennan, Marshall,
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scriptable. There are also the circumstances that demand secondary or third
party response depending on judicial expression, including what to do
when life is stolen, misappropriated, or fraudulently acquired.
In part, expressive minimalism, or low-level signaling by the court, in
the realm of biotechnology, might be driven by three factors: limited in-
formation; ambivalence; or an expectation-hope really-that Congress
will demarcate the appropriate boundaries and conduct for biotech actors.
But expressive minimalism is an action; as an action it has communicative
force, even if it becomes misunderstood as ambivalence.
My hypothesis, then, is that rather than motivating legislative action,
or imbuing the bench with greater wisdom or information, expressive mi-
nimalism in the context of biotechnology will likely send fuzzy signals.
Fuzzy signals will not be clear messages to the legislature. To the contrary,
fuzzy signals, like those transmitted across cell phones and televisions,
discombobulate messages, distort pictures, and ultimately, are difficult to
read. In most cases, when signals from televisions or cell phones become
fuzzy, people change the channels or reboot the systems. Rarely is there
incentive to listen through fuzzy noise. The false presumption relied on by
those who regard judicial minimalism (or fuzziness) as directly signaling
the legislature is that legislative bodies are inclined, motivated, or incenti-
vized to listen.
If this is correct, expressive minimalism will not result in legislative
action. Worse yet, fuzzy signals from the judiciary will not promote the
development of responsive public policy in the immediate cases or those to
come. The claim here is not that legislators lack the capacity to shape pub-
lic policy without judicial guidance. Rather, it is that judges do not serve
two lords: the voter and the donor (at least by degrees far less than legisla-
tors). Because there are times that the legislature will be captive to collec-
tive action, pressured by special interest, and responsive to their economic
interests, their attention will be difficult to capture and catalyzing action
over morally sensible, but politically unpopular issues will be impossible.
The lesson from Brown v. Board of Education is exactly that. When
legislative bodies malfunction because of biases, courts can intervene to
correct the breakdown in the political process. Courts have the capacity to
articulate principles that acknowledge minority interest when the legisla-
ture is captured by majoritarian interests. Where legislators see and respond
to risk by avoidance, courts can intervene without the threat of harm, in-
cluding removal from office.
If this assumption is correct, expressive minimalism in the courts will
undermine the legitimacy of timely, equitable claims initiated by plaintiffs.
[Vol 84:1
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By that, this essay suggests that expressive minimalism will be understood
as denying the ripeness of some claims, or as implying that current law
does not fit the futuristic-type problems common in biotech cases. Instead,
defaults will be created whereby fuzzy messages will tend to absolve--or
at least give a pass to-rogue biotech actors.
To be sure, robust expressionism and clear messages will not always
communicate what some actors and institutions desire to hear. Nor is it
guaranteed that those messages will be responsive to social minorities or
political non-elites. In the context of civil rights and racial equality claims,
the vigorous judicial expressionism in Dred Scott and Plessy communicate
quite clearly a political disaffection and disregard for African Americans.
But that notwithstanding, it was the robust messaging in both cases that
motivated legislative action, and not timid, fuzzy, minimalism. Thus the
question is not whether robust expressionism from courts will get it wrong
some of the time. Rather, in the instances of mistakes, can the cart be
righted? The prediction here is that robust judicial expressionism will fur-
ther democratic action, by promoting transparency, invigorating the politi-
cal process, and awakening the legislature. To the extent that the
legislature's authority in a particular sphere becomes undermined by judi-
cial action or the legislative body becomes dissatisfied with a legal ruling,
the political process can right the cart.
Fuzzy signaling will also affect behavior. The function of expression,
after all, is to communicate a message. When the message is fuzzy it will
nonetheless communicate about a legal rule and shape behavior, even by
default. So how will bad actors read fuzzy messages? If under the cloud of
fuzzy messages, bad actors will tend to "get away" with behaviors that are
normatively deemed as "bad," then bad actors will continue to engage in
harmful behaviors. Bad actors will not be risk averse as a general rule.
Indeed, there will be no incentive to engage in risk aversive behavior if
courts decline to send that message and legislatures are silent. Indeed, bad
actors acting badly will likely serve as a signal to other actors as to what
the law tolerates.
This essay unpacks three concepts in the body. It engages the reader in
several intellectual thought experiments. In Part I, I argue that fuzzy signal-
ing dominates judicial responses to questions of nomenclature in the human
body. This section urges that market realities already exist in the human
body and the judiciary's intentional ignorance of that will not signal legis-
lative action, nor will it create structural incentives for bad actors to behave
differently. In Parts II through IV, I lay out three intellectual thought expe-
riments and in each section scrutinize the value and risk of expressive mi-
2009]
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nimalism to the claims upon which the sections are developed.
In Part II, I flesh out what fuzzy signaling means in the context of tort
cases involving physician misappropriation of human body parts. Part III
examines presumed consent measures, arguing that the compulsory aspect
of the regulations makes these forced donations problematic. Forced use of
non-consenting individuals' tissues is justifiable only if the donation is
viewed as a form of civic duty, or if our bodies are property of the state.
Part IV addresses tort liability in body part transplant cases, suggesting that
the mishmash left behind from formalistic rule making (see Parts II and III)
indicates that the status of the body can change from one handler to the
next. Part V argues that entrenched minimal expressionism in a rapidly
expanding biotechnological world will undermine the natural maturation
and evolution of the common law. Part VI concludes this essay.
I. ASSIGNING THE BODY
Nowhere is fuzzy signaling more apparent than how and for what pur-
poses courts define the body. Mostly courts have been reluctant to ac-
knowledge or assign property interests in the body (for plaintiffs), perhaps
in an effort to acknowledge prior judicial ambivalence to antebellum sla-
very, or demonstrate respect for "personhood," or perhaps a combination of
both. Nevertheless, market realities in the body already exist 24 and judicial
failure to recognize this has its own perverse consequences, including a
sorely lacking and undeveloped nomenclature, the exploitation of human
subjects, 25 a loosely monitored but robust market in buying and selling
purloined human tissues,26 and an expanding, conflicting common law.
27
The rapid growth of biotechnology produces considerable demand and uses
24. Medical researchers, for example, partake in the market of human tissues when they obtain
authorization for medical tests and samples that later result in patenting of cell lines or other similar
financially beneficial medical products. See, e.g., Donna Dickenson, Consent, Commodification and
Benefit-Sharing in Genetic Research, 4 DEVELOPING WORLD BIOETHICS 109 (2004) (focusing on
disadvantaged populations both in the developing world and in First World countries). In addition, a
rather robust market in human eggs exists and is well-publicized and documented. See, e.g., Kenneth
Baum, Golden Eggs: Towards the Rational Regulation of Oocyte Donation, 2001 BYU L. REv. 107,
107-12 (2001) (discussing an infertile couple's solicitation of female students attending prestigious
universities for oocyte donation and a website advertising auctions for oocytes and sperm, and docu-
menting the resulting media coverage).
25. For a thorough discussion of exploitation of disadvantaged populations in medical research,
see Dickenson, supra note 24.
26. Purloined tissue cases have cropped up in New York, Philadelphia, New Jersey, Florida, and
other states. See Robert Smith, Four Indicted in Case of Tissue Theft (National Public Radio broadcast
Feb. 23, 2006), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5230544).
27. Even the state of the law governing the transfers of human eggs (a rather common occurrence
among couples facing infertility) is conflicting. See Baum, supra note 24, at 123-34.
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for human body parts.28 Human tissue, bones, and cartilage, now captured
for biotechnological purposes, in a prior generation were considered human
waste and thus discarded by doctors, hospitals, and clinics. 29 That medical
and market reality has changed. There is a market in body parts, and physi-
cians, hospitals, and patients have come to rely on their availability. How
human "parts" are acquired may be more troubling than the fact that black
markets exist. Acquisition occurs through coercion and fraud (in other
words, tissues donated for altruistic purposes, but later sold by the reci-
pient),30 funeral homes and crematoriums desecrating and selling body
parts, 31 and misappropriation from some physicians, scientists, and re-
searchers. 32
Notwithstanding a rather robust human biologics industry, some scho-
lars conclude that to place a financial value on the body is to diminish its
personhood and pollute our otherwise essentialized understanding of its
legal, social, and moral status.33 To scholars like Margaret Radin, the hu-
man body is a sacred entity, and its status as such is violated by any associ-
28. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U. S. CONGRESS, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY: OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS 23 (1987). The report stated that:
Over the past decade, however, technological advances have resulted in new, enhanced me-
thods for studying and using human body parts-particularly tissues and cells .... Human
samples are not only an integral part of the biomedical research process, but they are now also
used as a component of (or in the production of) a variety of commercial products ranging
from drugs and vaccines to pregnancy test kits.
Id.
29. One of the seminal cases regarding pecuniary gain from material otherwise considered to be
medical waste occurred in 1990. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). A
leukemia patient underwent treatment at UCLA's Medical Center. After removing the patient's spleen
as part of his treatment, one of the doctors who treated the patient used his cells to develop and patent a
profitable cell line. Id. at 480-82.
30. See Michele Goodwin, Commerce in Cadavers is an Open Secret, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2004,
at B 15 (discussing litigation in state and federal courts involving the black market sale of body parts
taken from cadavers donated by family members); Charles Omstein & Monte Morin, UC Got Body
Parts Warning a Year Ago, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2004, at Al (discussing the alleged black market sales
of donated cadavers by UCLA employees).
31. See Jeff Nesmith, Funeral Home Thefts: Body Parts May be Tainted-Patients Tested as
'Ripple of Fear' Reaches Atlanta, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 23, 2006, at Al; Paul Harris, Raising the
Dead, OBSERVER, Apr. 2, 2006, at 20, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/apr/02/
usa.features; see also Jackson v. Biomedical Tissue Servs., No 06-CV-1323 (D. N.J. complaint filed
Mar. 30, 2006) (plaintiff alleging that hepatitis was contracted through purloined body parts sold in the
donor market).
32. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 480-81 (involving a UCLA Medical Center physician who concealed
from his patient that additional cells were being removed from the patient in order to conduct profitable
research); Dickenson, supra note 24, at 110 (discussing one researcher's misrepresentation to a certain
population in New Guinea that she wanted blood samples to check for insects, when she actually
wanted the samples to enhance research in pursuit of a patent, and another set of researcher's misrepre-
sentations to Chinese villagers that they would receive medical care in exchange for DNA samples).
33. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1865 (1987) (ar-
guing that economic analysis is morally wrong when applied to the human body).
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ation with financial evaluations and market terms and conditions. 34 An
extrapolation of Radin's theory is that the body should remain an inaliena-
ble vessel, without regard to the uses governments and private entities find
for it, lawful or not.35 Legal and social commentators invoke the horrific
slave experience in the United States to buttress their claim and to demon-
strate in graspable, bare terms the significant consequences of placing fi-
nancial value on human beings. 36 To suggest that their concerns are less
relevant to contemporary biotechnology invites remonstration from varied
ideological corners wedded to an anticommodification, incommensurability
perspective. Their reasons for avoiding overdue dialogues about what ulti-
mately involves the reach of biotechnology into intimate spaces are not
altogether difficult to understand, even if slightly naive.
Ultimately, the fear of speculating about or even contemplating the
body in any legal terms other than our late nineteenth century understand-
ing, based on the possibility we will cross into the bounds of slavery or
based on excessive formalism limits the potential for robust, informed,
meaningful, contemporary dialogue and debate on a critical topic of our
times. 37 Furthermore, this apprehension undermines scholars' ability to
credibly engage in policy debates on the reach and normative positioning of
biotechnology within the law. Biotechnology can, will, and has run amok
amid this indeterminacy. Such fears might actively serve to deflect race,
gender, and class issues, but in doing so, also leads to the dodging of subs-
tantive inquiry and analysis of markets that already exist and affect racia-
lized bodies.
II. THE RESEARCHED BODY
Part II illuminates three conceptions of the body and identifies the
fuzzy signaling in each case. The first conception is the Moore Model,
based on a case read in Torts and Property classes during law school. The
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Robert Arnold et al., Financial Incentives for Cadaver Organ Donation: An Ethical Reap-
praisal, 73 TRANSPLANTATION 1361, 1366 (2002) ("It is also important to note that our society does
not permit its capitalistic system to operate in certain commodified exchanges because they are consi-
dered to be intrinsically wrong.").
37. Years ago, the question of body part ownership might have been construed as an academic
exercise, something otherwise theoretical, with no real-world implications. Or simply fiction. That
would be a misconception in today's marketplace. The question of body part ownership has practical
implications and consequences for everyone, including almost 99,000 patients waiting for organs. See,
e.g., STEPHEN WILKINSON, BODIES FOR SALE: ETHIcS AND EXPLOITATION IN THE HUMAN BODY
TRADE 136, 174, 207-09 (2003) (comparing paid surrogacy, DNA patenting and slavery).
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other two conceptions are slightly more obscure. Most obvious in these
thought experiments is that a wrong has occurred. Defining what that
wrong is, in light of contemporary formalistic jurisprudence, fuzzy signal-
ing and legislative silence, is another matter.
A. The Give Me 'Moore" Model: Body Part as Intellectual Property
Model A:
If G (physician) persuades M to have his spleen removed (under
pretense of imminent death), and M complies, but is unaware
that G has pre-established pecuniary and organizational interests
(established business relationships) in exploiting the spleen and
cells, and G and his associates actively exploit the cells, and G
withholds this information from M, including notice of a patent
derived from the use of M's spleen, sperm, and blood, has there
been a violation of M's rights? If so what kind? Can a claim be
made for which relief is available?
Model A(2):
X, clueless, kept raw diamonds in his pocket, but was convinced
by Y (his lawyer) to remove the diamonds to save his life, and X
complied. Y conspired to and did obtain the diamonds after X
removed the diamonds from the pocket. Three years later, the
newly polished, cut diamonds are ready for the market and Y
successfully transfers them to new owners for millions of dol-
lars. Has there been a violation of X's rights? If so what kind?
Can a claim be made for which relief is available?
Model A, based on Moore v. Regents of the University of California,38
is perhaps the most recognized body part appropriation case. On October 8,
1976, Dr. David Golde, an employee of the University of California at Los
Angeles Medical Center, informed Mr. Moore "that he had reason to fear
for his life, and that the proposed splenectomy operation.. . was necessary
to slow down the progress of his disease." 39 Moore consented to the opera-
tion. If taken as true that Moore's life depended on the surgery, we are left
to wrestle with the legal and moral implications of the physician-patient
relationship at the time of the operation and later. Golde's conduct prior to
the operation rightfully draws scrutiny as possibly conflicting-or giving
the appearance of conflicting-with his fiduciary obligations to Moore's (if
38. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
39. Id. at 481 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the doctor's financial motivations were alive at the time of the operation).
Yet, this view is not shared by all. For some, the moral questions are
rendered less significant by the necessity of Moore's operation. To some
audiences, the necessity that dictated Moore's operation served to immun-
ize the physician from subsequent liability. From this view, so long as the
operation was necessary, the physician did not cause any additional or un-
necessary harm to Moore. What might have been incinerated became a
valuable research tool and resource, which ultimately benefited patients.
However, the moral and legal questions are not easily resolved, even if
one were to accept the necessity and urgency of Moore's initial operation
with Dr. Golde. Within days of the meeting with Moore, Dr. Golde and
Shirley Quan, a researcher at UCLA, formed a partnership with the intent
of making "arrangements to obtain portions of [Moore's] spleen following
its removal and to take them to a separate research unit."'40 Over the next
few years, Golde subjected Moore to additional tests (extracting blood,
sperm, bone marrow, and other fluids), fraudulently inducing him to com-
mute to Los Angeles from Seattle under the pretense of medical necessi-
ty.4 1 Nearly three years later, according to the court record, "Golde
established a cell line from Moore's T-lymphocytes. ' ' 42 In 1981, the Re-
gents applied for a patent on the cell lines and listed Quan and Golde as
"inventors," 43 the royalties and profits from which would be shared by the
inventors and Regents. It is estimated that billions of dollars have been
recouped from the exploitation of Moore's spleen and other tissues.
Without an appreciation for "what" the legal status of Moore's cells,
sperm, and spleen were, the California Supreme Court justices were ill-
equipped to define what the legal remedy should be. The court, finding that
there was no other judicial or legislative guidance that would treat Moore's
spleen and the cell line as property, dismissed his conversion claim. 44 To
40. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
41. Id.
42. Id. The particular lymphocyte derived from Moore's spleen is described as "a type of white
blood cell. T-lymphocytes produce lymphokines, or proteins that regulate the immune system. Some
lymphokines have potential therapeutic value. If the genetic material responsible for producing a partic-
ular lymphokine can be identified, it can sometimes be used to manufacture large quantities of the
lymphokine through the techniques of recombinant DNA." Id. at 482 n.2.
43. Id. at 482.
44. Id. at 488. Moore's original complaint raised thirteen causes of action. The court observed,
"[e]ach defendant demurred to each purported cause of action. The superior court, however, expressly
considered the validity of only the first cause of action, conversion." Id. at 482. The court reasoned that
the other causes of action were defective. The other claims included: (I) lack of informed consent; (2)
breach of fiduciary duty; (3) fraud and deceit; (4) unjust enrichment; (5) quasi-contract; (6) bad faith
breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (7) intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress; (8) negligent misrepresentation; (9) intentional interference with prospective advantageous eco-
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suggest, as the court did, that his biological materials were sui generis,
addresses only Moore's health condition, but provides little guidance as to
the plaintiff's legal status. The court incorrectly suggests that there was no
possessory interest in Moore's cell line. In fact, Dr. Golde possessed an
interest protected by law. But why didn't Moore?
If "clueless" man, X, can have an interest in the diamonds in his cus-
tody, how can we deduce that one lacks an equal interest in his spleen,
cells, sperm, and other biological materials? The distinction seems arbi-
trary; crafting a rule where skin is the barrier to ownership seems absurd. In
other words, diamonds external to the skin (in one's pocket) is a possession
for which there is a rule of ownership, but that which is within the skin has
no ownership value? Or that which has external value, has no value if it is
trapped within the body? If Moore had swallowed valuable gemstones such
as diamonds, would the value of the goods have been lost because they
were no longer external?
Consider also that X's recovery is not limited to his awareness or abil-
ity to guess the value of the diamonds. Even the shamelessly ignorant
plaintiff is entitled to relief.45 If the diamonds were worth five million dol-
lars, but the shamelessly ignorant owner guessed their relative value at five
dollars, the law refuses to be punitive towards him or punish him for his
ignorance, by limiting his recovery to five dollars. 46 To do so would un-
justly enrich Y, his lawyer, and provide an incentive for lawyers to defraud
their clients.
As between the two models above, the California Supreme Court
would have no difficulty divining the remedy for someone coerced out of
his diamonds by his lawyer and sending a robust signal. Scholars should
not be comfortable with the fact that the court would be blind to an equally
hostile action, involving a doctor secretly obtaining his patient's cell line
and exploiting it for his financial interests.
In Model A, G, the physician and his collaborators, were likely in the
best position to honestly describe the value of Moore's body parts. They
were aware of the value that could be derived from isolating particular
products from his cell line. They understood the nature of the market's
demand for the products they could derive. G and his collaborators also
nomic relationships; (10) slander of title; (11) accounting; and (12) declaratory relief. Id. at 482 n.4.
45. See, e.g., Childs v. Haussecker, 974 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. 1998).
46. See id. at 38 ("[P]ermitting the cause of action of a 'blamelessly ignorant' plaintiff to accrue
before he or she could possibly have been aware of the injury would be unjust."); see also Michael D.
Green, The Paradox of Statutes of Limitations in Toxic Substances Litigation, 76 CAL. L. REv. 965
(1988).
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understood their unique market advantage; securing a patent on Moore's
cell-line gave them a legal monopoly on all its derivatives. Nevertheless,
the court in Moore deflected, dismissing virtually all of Moore's claims,
and rejecting the concept of self-ownership in one's body. 47 The court cau-
tioned that Moore had no interest in his cell-line after the patent was
created. But the court missed the point of Moore's claim, that he had a
protected legal interest in his cells, tissues, and blood before the unautho-
rized use by his doctors occurred and before the patent was issued. The
timing of the patent is a false timestamp and mistakenly applied by the
court; a patent does not cut off past interest, or according to Justice Mosk,
present or future rights.
III. THE PRESUMED BODY
A. Presuming Consent: Body Part as State Good
Model B: The Good Samaritan:
B dies of sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS). D, a hospital
staff member, removes B's comeas pursuant to a statute in-
tended to increase the supply of corneas in the state. B's parents
later learn of the extraction and file a lawsuit, claiming the sta-
tute is unconstitutional because it fails to provide notice and an
opportunity to object. Is the statute unconstitutional? Has a con-
stitutionally protected right been breached?
Model B represents the presumed consent scheme, which acknowl-
edges that the body has value as a source of transplantable goods. Howev-
er, that value is gifted to the state absent notification to the state that the
gift is revoked. 4 8 First enacted in Maryland, 49 presumed consent laws op-
47. Moore, 793 P.2d at 488 (holding that the tort of conversion does not apply to his "biological
materials"). However, the holding in Moore does not signify that harm has not occurred nor that an
injury has not been sustained. Rather, the court does indicate that damages might be difficult to calcu-
late.
48. UNIV. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 4 (1987).
49. See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-509.1 (2005). The statute sets forth the following
framework for determining when a comeal may be provided for transplant:
(a) In any case where a patient is in need of comeal tissue for a transplant, the Chief Medical
Examiner, the deputy chief medical examiner, or an assistant medical examiner may provide
the comea upon the request of the Medical Eye Bank of Maryland, Incorporated. .. under the
following conditions:
(1) The medical examiner has charge of a decedent who may provide a suitable comea
for the transplant or research;
(2) An autopsy will be required;
(3) No objection by the next of kin is known by the medical examiner;
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erate much like conscription or substituted judgment, whereby one's choice
to pursue or not to pursue a particular course of action with her body is
usurped by the state. 50 Pursuant to statutory authority, medical examiners,
coroners, and their designated personnel are authorized to extract corneas,
heart valves, and other tissues from cadavers without first obtaining con-
sent from the "donor" if the donor has not declined a donation. 51 The illu-
sory opt-out provision veils the fact that such laws are more like
conscription measures and less like an option or "choice." Where, after all,
is one to "opt-out?" How do the dead opt-out? How can the uninformed
relative opt-out? Indeed, studies demonstrate that most people, even local
legislators such as aldermen and city council members, are relatively igno-
rant about presumed consent (in their own states) and possess a limited
understanding of what the term signifies or what the law authorizes.
52
Presumed consent statutes are compulsory measures that obligate in-
dividuals to donate. The legislation authorizing this type of body part con-
(4) No religious objection made by the decedent before death is known by the medical
examiner; and
(5) Removal of the cornea for transplant will not interfere with the subsequent course of
an investigation or autopsy or alter the postmortem facial appearance....
(c) The Chief Medical Examiner, the deputy chief medical examiner, an assistant medical ex-
aminer, and the Medical Eye Bank of Maryland, Incorporated... are not liable for civil ac-
tion if the next of kin subsequently contends that authorization of that kin was required.
50. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 4 (stating that "[t]he [coroner] [medical examiner] may
release and permit the removal of a part from a body within that official's custody").
51. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-851, 36-852 (West 1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-325
(2005); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 27491.46-.47 (West 2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-10-621 (2005); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-281 (West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. § 29-4712 (West 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 765.5185 (West 2006); GA. CODE ANN § 31-23-6 (1985); HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327-4 (2004);
IDAHO CODE § 39-3405 (2005); ILL. ANN. STAT. § ch. 110 1/2, § 351-354 (Smith-Hurd 1983); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.187 (2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:2354, 33:1565 (West 2005); MD. CODE
ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-509.1 (2005); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 113, § 14 (Law Co-op Supp. 1989);
MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 333.10202 (West 2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-61-71 (1989); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 58.770 (West 2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-17-215 (2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-391
(2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.2-04 (1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.60 (West 2005); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. § 63-944.1 (West 2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23- 18.6-4 (2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-30-
204 (1989); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 693.012 (Vernon 2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-4-
23 (2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 68.50.280 (2006); 2005 WIs. LAWS § 157.06; W. VA. CODE § 16-
19-4 (2005).
52. Ralph Frammolino, Harvest of Corneas at Morgue Questioned, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1997, at
Al (investigating over 570 cases of nonconsensual cornea harvesting during a 12-month period, and
explaining that families "were shocked that they had not been asked or told"). See also, Michele Good-
win, Organ Transplant Survey Analysis (Feb. 16, 2000) (unpublished, on file with the author). This
survey was administered in Lexington, Kentucky, with the assistance of Janet Givens, special assistant
to former Mayor Pam Miller. Participants consisted of administrators in the Mayor's Office and mem-
bers of the City Council of Lexington, Kentucky. Only one of fifteen government officials surveyed (or
6.6%) in this group was aware of the term "presumed consent," although Kentucky had authorized
legislative consent over ten years prior to the survey.
2009]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
scription operates pursuant to mandatory autopsy statutes. 53 Thus, the only
bodies to which presumed consent applies are victims of homicide or cata-
strophic deaths requiring a medical investigation. Disproportionately, in
some states, blacks and Latinos are the overwhelming majority of the pre-
sumed consent donors. 54 In California, in June 1997, for example, over
80% of presumed consent donors were black and Latino. 55 In effect, in the
California cases of misappropriation, the state presumes that blacks and
Latinos would have agreed to donate were they alive and able to make the
choice.
But if compulsory exploitation of bodies is permissible, why not
forced sex? The compulsory aspect of the regulations makes these dona-
tions problematic. Forced use of non-consenting individuals' tissues is
justifiable only if the donation is viewed as a form of civic duty, or if our
bodies are property of the state. Donation as a civic duty is a laudable con-
cept, though not supported by social custom or an American legal tradition.
Our common law tradition abjures the duty to rescue doctrine, and more
pointedly warns, "rescue at your own risk.' ' 56 That the emptied bodies of
blacks and Latinos belong in service to the state cannot be justified by the
ways in which we organize labor, medicine, or our system of justice.
Marx's concept of a communitarian society, operating for the common
good of man and woman, no matter how commendable, is not a philosophy
that constitutional framers or the subsequent generations of electorate
adopted. This notion of compelled altruism belies the reality that only 20%
of Americans carry donor cards-a more realistic reflection of their affir-
53. See, e.g., Fred H. Cate, Human Organ Transplantation: The Role of Law, 20 J. CORP. L. 69,
84 (1995) (noting that presumed consent "laws generally provide that a coroner or medical examiner
may remove the corneas from a cadaver in the course of a legally-required autopsy").
54. See Gabriel Escobar, Deaths Pose Continuing D.C. Mystery; City Carries Hundreds of Unde-
termined Cases, Muddying Vital Statistics, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 1997, at AI (commenting on the rise
in urban violence in the 1980s and remarking that many of the deaths of black urban Americans from
that era remain unsolved); Glen Loury, The Impossible Dilemma, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan 1, 1996, at 21
(noting that the murder rate among black youths (under age 20), which was already three times that of
white youths in 1986, doubled in the five years between 1986 and 1991, while the white rate remained
unchanged); see also Darryl Fears, Urban Spotlight: Is Atlanta the Next Detroit?, ATL. JOURNAL-
CONSTITUTION, Dec. 18, 1994, at DI (pointing out that in the early 1980s, the homicide rate soared).
Fears reports that between 1983 and 1987, more than 700 people were slain each year. On No Crime
Day in Detroit-a 1986 event sponsored by basketball star Isaiah Thomas to prove his city was still
safe-a police officer was shot dead. Id.
55. Frammolino, supra note 52. See also The Late Edition: Crime in the US. is Discussed (CNN
television broadcast Oct. 24, 1993); Eric Lichtblau, Reporter's Notebook: Going beyond Line Scores of
Gang Carnage, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1990, at B3 (noting that during a one month time span there were
over 300 gang-related killings in Los Angeles County); Larry King Live: Spying on Neighbors-The
New Drug- War Strategy (CNN television broadcast Aug. 15, 1990).
56. See Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343, 346 (Pa. 1959) (refusing to impose liability on defendant
for failure to render aid in a drowning death).
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mative intent to donate.
Model B raises questions about duty, notice, appeal, and due process.
In Georgia Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant,57 parents of an infant (dead as a
result of SIDS) filed suit against the eye bank that was authorized by the
state medical examiner to remove their son's corneas. The parents were not
consulted and therefore had not authorized the removal. Essentially, the
parents were denied the opportunity to object to the extraction. 58 The trial
court held in favor of the parents, opining that the imposed consent statute
violated due process in that it deprives a person of a property right in the
corpse of her next of kin, and fails to provide notice and an opportunity to
object. 59 Their complaint relied on a common law duty to properly bury
and dispose of the deceased imposed by ecclesiastical courts on the next of
kin of deceased persons. 60 Over time, this duty became interpreted and
litigated as a "right" to dispose in any "appropriate" and "decent" manner
afforded by the relatives. 61 Despite its own common law tradition uphold-
ing quasi property right interests in the dead for the next of kin, the Georgia
Supreme Court reversed, ruling that parents have no interest in the body of
their dead children.62
The ruling in Georgia Lions belied the status of dead bodies within the
common law on the point of quasi property right interests. Previously,
Georgia courts, as have other U.S. courts, fashioned a "quasi property"
right out of the duty to bury. Quasi property right interests in the dead were
affirmed by a Georgia court in the 1937 case, Pollard v. Phelps,63 which
established that "the courts of civilized and Christian countries regard re-
spect for the dead as not only a virtue but a duty, and hold that, in the ab-
sence of testamentary disposition, a quasi property right belongs to the
husband or wife, and, if neither, to the next of kin." 64 Thus, if quasi proper-
ty rights represent a substantive liberty, then it would seem that a violation
of those interests occurs when a state encroaches upon those spindles of
57. 335 S.E.2d 127 (Ga. 1985).
58. Id. at 128.
59. Id.
60. Id. See also Rivers v. Greenwood Cemetery, 22 S.E.2d 134, 135 (Ga. 1942) (The Georgia
Supreme Court held "that a dead body is quasi property over which the relatives of the deceased have
rights which the courts will protect.").
61. Kathryn E. Peterson, Note, My Father's Eyes and My Mother's Heart: The Due Process
Rights of the Next of Kin in Organ Donation, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 169, 186 (2005) (arguing that the
"next of kin have a right to bury the body of a decedent in an appropriate manner").
62. Rivers, 22 S.E.2d at 134.
63. 193 S.E. 102 (Ga. Ct. App. 1937).
64. Id. at 106.
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"rights" without due process, even in a utilitarian system designed to bene-
fit a public purpose.
"Quasi property" rights diminish in their perceived value unless such
interests can be protected from arbitrary state action. The Georgia Lions
court's assertion that statutory enactments naturally trump common law
rules is correct only in instances when the statute itself does not violate
constitutional protections. 65 Brown v. Board of Education, which provided
that all provisions of state laws and regulation must yield to the principle
that racial discrimination is unconstitutional, as well as Skinner v Oklaho-
ma,6 6 which overturned state mandated sterilization of persons considered
"habitual criminals," 67 demonstrate a well-established principle that legis-
lation is subject to judicial scrutiny and more importantly constitutional
protections. These cases are persuasive reminders that regulations crafted
from legislative authority are neither absolute nor immune from constitu-
tional scrutiny. 68
Thus, in the transplantation context, whether presumed consent laws
pass constitutional muster deserves serious judicial scrutiny, not fuzzy sig-
naling. Because presumed consent procurement is triggered by homicide
deaths in most states rather than all deaths, the line of proscription becomes
arbitrary as the statute requires only those whose deaths resulted from mur-
der or catastrophic injury to surrender body parts. And although limited in
scope, this rule is not narrowly tailored to achieve its stated goal. Rather, a
narrow tailoring here might advisedly involve mechanisms for consent and
refusal to donate despite the laudability of body part donation.
65. Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 797 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that "Although
the underlying substantive interest is created by 'an independent source such as state law,' federal
constitutional law determines whether that interest rises to the level of a 'legitimate claim or entitle-
ment' protected by the Due Process Clause") (quoting Memphis Light, Gas and Water Div. v. Craft, 436
U.S. 1, 9 (1978)).
66. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
67. Id. at 536. Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57 §§ 171-
95 (1935), defined a "habitual criminal" as
a person who, having been convicted two or more times for crimes 'amounting to felonies in-
volving moral turpitude' either in an Oklahoma court or in a court of any other State, is the-
reafter convicted of such a felony in Oklahoma and is sentenced to a term of imprisonment in
an Oklahoma penal institution.
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 537. The statute required that all men and women who were "habitual criminals"
submit to sterilization. Men were to receive vasectomies and women salpingectomies. The legislature
was convinced that such operations could take place (for the health and safety of the community)
without being a "detriment to his or her general health." The legislature, however, took pains to make
clear that "offenses arising out of the violation of the prohibitory laws, revenue acts, embezzlement, or
political offenses, shall not come or be considered within the terms of this Act." Id. at 536-37.
68. See id. at 535 (overturning Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act that provided for
the sexual sterilization of individuals convicted of three or more felonies of moral turpitude).
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Crafting a donor pool that draws primarily from homicide victims can
exacerbate class and race distinctions. 69 But most importantly, the rule
burdens only one classification of the deceased. 70 Effectively the law dis-
tinguishes the right to bury and even donate by mode of death. Yet consti-
tutional rights are neither so arbitrarily defined nor abridged.
If legislators truly believe that Americans support presumed consent
policies, why not require babies to surrender one kidney at birth? Only one
kidney is needed for a full and healthy life. It is conceivable that the bur-
dens and risks associated with this type of procurement process could be
justified by the benefits inured to others. Harvests could be done at the time
of vaccination. Doctors could monitor the healing process. Parents would
be more informed participants. Relatives, in town for the birth, could pro-
vide support and comfort the parents and child. For the baby, the scars
would heal seamlessly and more importantly, a life would be saved or ex-
tended, at least, for ten to fifteen years. Every child in the United States
would be part of a plan to "gift" life to another. This would surely cure the
organ shortage. But alas, Americans are not so generous; nor as a nation
have we embraced this type of horrific altruism.
To be sure, there is a lesser expectation of personal privacy for public
health initiatives that guard against diseases, such as compelled vaccina-
tions, 71 than for policies requiring individuals to surrender their bodies so
that vital parts may be plucked out to benefit the common good. The line is
not fine. To the contrary, vaccinations reasonably serve an interest that
most Americans are inclined to support. However, even with this lesser
expectation of privacy in vaccination cases or testing for AIDS and HIV,
there is powerful and persuasive dissent in the public sphere, which indi-
cates that Americans are deeply concerned about their personal privacy,
religious freedom, quality of life, autonomy, and the desire to be "free"
69. See Frammolino, supra note 52 (noting the overwhelming primary pool of presumed consent
donors in Los Angeles were black and Latino homicide victims); Michele Goodwin, Deconstructing
Legislative Consent Law: Organ Taking, Racial Profiling, & Distributive Justice, 6 VA. J. L. & TECH. 2
(2001).
70. If the objective of saving lives through transplantation were a compelling enough function for
the state, which justified ignoring privacy, religious freedom, due process, and eliminating a principle
right to bury, why limit the compelled donor pool to homicide victims or those who die by catastrophic
circumstances? Doing so places the body part supply burden on a narrow population already aggrieved
by the unanticipated loss.
71. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding the constitutionality of a
compulsory smallpox vaccination on the ground that it had a real and substantial relation to public
health and safety); McCormick v Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding constitutional a policy
to forcibly vaccinate prisoners against tuberculosis).
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from government interference or intrusion on their bodies. 72 That the statu-
tory provisions on which presumed consent laws are implemented rely
upon surreptitious planning and clandestine operations in coroners' offices
or during autopsies with medical examiners-usually without the consent
of relatives-indicates their statutory weakness.
IV. BODIES OF PARTS
A. Blood Shield Law Model: Body Part as a Service
Model C: Buyer Beware:
P, a college student, receives a knee implant (a tendon) from tis-
sues bought from TB. The implanted tissue is later found to be
contaminated with bacteria typically found in the human bowel.
P becomes gravely ill and dies four days later. His estate, learn-
ing that TB was aware of the contamination prior to selling the
tissues, sues under a theory of product liability. Does the estate
have a claim for which relief can be granted?
Few courts have ruled on the issue as to the status of a commercialized
body part or whether the purchasers of such parts have recourse when the
body parts are defective or contaminated. Those that have, as in the Cryo-
life, Inc. v. Superior Court73 and Condos v. Musculoskeletal Transplant
Foundation74 cases, relied on fuzzy signaling to arrive at arbitrary conclu-
sions. In both cases the courts ruled that bone tissues sold for transplanta-
tion were not actually products or goods (although arguably property of
their sellers), but rather services. 75
Such rulings leave duped purchasers without a cause of action and tis-
sue banks free from liability. The rulings indicate that the status of the body
can change from one handler to the next. Both cases expose a problematic
public policy. Now, to be sure, the courts in these cases recognized the
72. See Hill v. Evans, No. 91-A-626-N, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19878, at *17 (M.D. Ala. 1993)
(finding unconstitutional an Alabama law authorizing HIV testing of "high risk" patients); Michael
Lasalandra, BU Expert Faults CDCfor Vaccine Backlash, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 8, 2003, at A4; Joan
Lowy, Vaccination Backlash Worries Doctors, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETrE, May 9, 1999, at A3;
Katherine Seligman, Vaccination Backlash: There's a Small But Stubborn Faction of Parents Who
Don't Vaccinate Their Children. Are There Risks?, S.F. CHRON., May 25, 2003, at 8; Dan Olmsted, The
Age ofAutism: Christian's Mom Speaks, UPI, Apr. 12, 2006, http://www.upi.com/Health _News/2006/
04/12/The-Age-of-Autism-Christians-mom-speaks/UPI-64061144862113/ (highlighting an influential
parent's campaign to propose and implement alternatives to mandatory vaccinations).
73. Cryolife, Inc. v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. App. 4th 1145 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
74. Condos v. Musculoskeletal Transplant Found., 208 F. Supp, 2d 1226 (D. Utah 2002).
75. Cryolife, 110 Cal App 4th at 1159; Condos, 208 F. Supp. 2d at 1230.
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ownership interest or property interests in body parts. The relevant question
remains: who is the possessor or owner of body parts in the stream of
commerce? One way to interpret these transactions that seems fairly con-
sistent with the holdings is that the patient owned the tendon he purchased.
The tissue banks "owned" the tissues prior to selling them. However, it
appears from the logic of Cryolife that as soon as the good leaves the ware-
house of the tissue bank, the body part becomes a "service. ' 76 Thus, the
cases illuminate inconsistent treatment vis-A-vis the status of body parts.
For example, commercial exploiters of human tissues buy, process, and sell
the biological materials to patients via doctors and hospitals. Yet, the Con-
dos and Cryolife rulings conclude that tissue banks should not be held lia-
ble for placing contaminated tissues into the stream of commerce even if
their products cause the deaths or illnesses of consumers.
The contaminated tissue cases on which Model C is based represent a
third class of litigation explored in this essay that involve minimal expres-
sionism by courts. The model is based on the tragedy of Brian Lykins. His
life was cut short after a routine knee operation. According to one of the
lawyers involved in the litigation, Brian needed only the equivalent of a pin
to be placed into his knee. Brian was healthy and an outgoing twenty-three
year-old engineering student.77 He was a self-taught musician and very
close to his family. 78 The operation he required was a routine, out-patient
knee surgery. 79 What Brian received was more than he bargained for;
Cryolife, the company that sold the tendon to transplant into Brian's knee,
processed it from a cadaver, which remained unrefrigerated for nineteen
hours. 80 The cadaver from which the allograft was acquired had been re-
jected by other tissue processing companies. 81
Despite Cryolife's tests on the cadaver, which revealed infection, the
company sold the tendon at a tremendous mark-up to the hospital where the
76. Cryolife, 110 Cal. App. 4th at 1145.
77. See M.A.J. McKenna, Tissue Transplant Firm Linked to 14 Infections, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
Mar. 15, 2002, at Al (discussing the death of Bryan Lykins, a student in Minnesota, who died of bac-
terial infection as the result of his knee surgery).
78. Cryolife Litigation, Brian's Bio, available at http://www.cryolifelitigation.com/bio.asp (last
visited May 1, 2009).
79. See Robert Pear, FDA Delays Regulation of Tissue Transplants, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2003, at
Al 8 (noting that Brian Lykins died after undergoing a "routine knee surgery"); Amanda Gardner, U.S.
Strengthens Rules Governing Tissue, Organ Transplants, HEALTH DAY, Nov. 19, 2004,
http://news.healingwell.com/index.php?p-newsl&id=522463 (describing Brian Lykins' surgery as
"routine").
80. Gardner, supra note 79.
81. See Sandra Blakeslee, Lack of Oversight in Tissue Donation Raising Concerns, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 20, 2002, at Al (noting that "[iun many parts of the country, tissue banks that have contracts with
for-profit companies will accept donors other tissue banks have rejected as unsafe for use.").
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operation took place. 82 On November 7, 2001, Brian's new tendon was
implanted. 83 Within hours, his condition rapidly deteriorated. 84 By the
evening of the operation he was extremely ill.85 In four days, he was
dead. 86 He died November 9, 2001 as a result of an allograft which had
been contaminated with bacteria from the bowel of the cadaver from which
parts were processed and sold by Cryolife. 87
Several problems attend human tissue transplantation and the reconsti-
tution of body parts beyond the question of ownership. First, are warranties
appropriate for reconstituted, processed or restructured body parts? Second,
should recourse be granted for purchasers who unwittingly buy insalu-
brious tissues? Third, how do we frame remedies for injured plaintiffs-
through tort or contracts law? Some of these problems are illuminated in
disturbing narratives, including those of Bonny Gonyers, Ken Alescu, Syd-
ney Steinberg (a five year-old who died from a heart valve infection possi-
bly linked to Cryolife, the supplier of the body part that she received), and
similar cases. 88 In each instance, plaintiffs suffered injuries connected to
the implantation of infected human tissue. Severe injuries and even deaths
occurred not as a result of the surgical malfeasance, but due to diseased
tissues spreading deadly bacteria within the transplant hosts' bodies. Thus,
the issues in dispute with relation to the cases were less about the cause of
the injuries, but rather whether remedies exist for these injuries.
The question as to remedies becomes all the more relevant given the
significant demand for body parts and the growth of the tissue transplanta-
tion and genetic bioprospecting industries. 89 This technology is useful, but
imprecision and mistakes are likely to occur at many stages. And it seems
likely that the frequency of these issues arising will increase exponentially
in years to come. According to one reporter, tissue transplants, "fueled
82. But see Transplant Medicine, IMMUNOTHERAPY WEEKLY, Sept. 11, 2002, at 13 (noting that
Cryolife allegedly failed to test for the germ that caused the deadly infection).
83. See Tissue Banks: The Dangers of Tainted Tissue and the Need for Federal Regulation:
Hearing Before the US Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. 6 (2003) (testimony of Steven and Leslie Lykins,
parents of Bryan Lykins) available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/shrg 1081 10tissuebanksreg.pdf (last
visited Feb. 7, 2008) (hereinafter Lykins Hearings).
84. Id. at 8.
85. Id.
86. See David McNaughton, CryoLife Tries to Bounce Back; Tissue Recall by FDA Spawns
Losses, ATL. JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Aug. 28, 2003, at DI (noting that Brian Lykins died from
"[c]lostridium sordelli, a bacteria that spreads from the intestine to the rest of the body after death").
87. Id.
88. See Sandra Blakeslee, Recall is Ordered at Large Supplier of Transplant Tissue, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 15, 2002, at Al (discussing the FDA's order for Cryolife to recall all soft tissues it had sold).
89. Rebecca Skloot, Taking the Least of You, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2006 (Magazine), at 38.
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largely by demand for tissue for spine surgery ... has become a billion-
dollar industry." 90 In 2004, "there were about a million tissue transplants in
the United States." 91 That figure represents nearly a three-fold increase in
one decade. 92 To the extent that treatments are now available for worn-out
knees and joints and defective or blocked heart valves, doctors will contin-
ue to recommend these types of elective treatments for their patients. Their
failure to do so might be actionable itself; failure to enhance, even by
chance, a patient's health outcome can result in civil liability in a growing
number of jurisdictions. 93
Nevertheless, problems are unresolved, even with the Center for Dis-
ease Control's (CDC) investigations revealing the numerous problems at
tissue bank laboratories, and the very direct links between the deaths and
illness of consumers and cadaver sources used by the companies that
processed and sold the body parts that they purchased. Recent jurispru-
dence unwisely places the burden on patients and doctors to guard against
implanting contaminated body parts. 94
With this type of fuzzy guidance from courts, how are patients, often
the least informed, to police this process? 95 Patients, and even their doc-
tors, are simply uninformed and it would seem unreasonable to expect them
to acquire health and lifestyle information about the cadavers from whom
the body parts are harvested. 96 Certainly courts can appreciate that tissue
banks are in the best position to do that research and indeed are obligated to
90. Renie Schapiro, Banking on the Gift of Tissue, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 2, 2005, at GI.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Margaret T. Mangan, The Loss of Chance Doctrine: A Small Price to Pay for Human Life, 42
S.D. L. REv. 279, 290 (1997) ("Most courts which have had an opportunity to decide upon the loss of
chance doctrine recognize a cause of action for loss of chance in medical malpractice actions."); see
also Delaney v. Cade, 26 F.3d 991, 991 (10th Cir. 1994) (concluding that Kansas recognizes loss of
chance); LaRose v. Wash. Univ., 154 S.W.3d 365, 370-72 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (upholding jury award
of damages against physician whose failure to diagnose cancer in patient reduced her chance of surviv-
al).
94. See Condos v. Musculoskeletal Transplant Found., 208 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1230 (D. Utah
2002); Cryolife Inc. v. Super. Ct., I 10 Cal. App. 4th 1145, 1154-60 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); Johnson v.
Super. Ct., 101 Cal. App. 4th 869, 886-89 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (limiting the recovery of parents seek-
ing damages because sperm bank failed to disclose that purchased sperm came from a donor with a
history of kidney disease, which their daughter later inherited); Lenahan v. Univ. of Chi., 808 N.E.2d
1078, 1087 (Il1. App. Ct. 2004) ("Plaintiffs failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the defendants
knowingly and voluntarily participated in a common scheme to commit any tortious acts in relation
thereto.").
95. See Law Firms File Suit on Behalf of Transplant Patient Who Allegedly Received Illegally
Harvested Body Parts; Suit Alleges That Untested Bones in Transplant Led to Positive Hepatitis Test
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do so. Warning labels on sealed packages, containing tendons and human
bones, serve to limit the liability of tissue banks, but do not rectify the in-
formation deficit.
Recent controversy involving the pillaging of body parts from funeral
home cadavers in New York and New Jersey further illuminates this point.
In February 2006, the Brooklyn District Attorney Charles Hynes charged
four grave pillagers with "medical terrorism."' 97 Hynes claimed the body-
robbing scandal was "unique in its utter disregard for human decency. '98 It
was the latest horrific episode in the ongoing tissue transplant industry
saga. The indictment alleged that a New Jersey dentist, Michael Mastroma-
rino, and codefendants robbed over a thousand bodies of bones, ligaments,
heart valves, organs, and other valuable tissues. 99 The defendants stuffed
the bodies with plastic tubing to deceive relatives. 100 Detectives and inves-
tigators unmasked their furtive scheme, but only after thousands of body
parts, some from diseased corpses, were sold for transplantation to hospit-
als, doctors, and patients throughout the United States101 and international-
ly. 102 Tissue, similar to blood transfusions, can transmit hepatitis, HIV,
mad cow disease, bacteria, and various other communicable diseases to the
unsuspecting transplant recipient. 103
That patients and their doctors are at a practical disadvantage seems
clear. 104 Both parties lack information about the cadavers' lifestyles, sexual
habits, prior illnesses, and whether the "donors" smoked, drank, or used
drugs. Surgeons, though skilled, are not microbiologists and lack the exper-
97. Tonya Maxwell, 4 Charged With Stealing Bones Implanted Locally, CHII. TRHB., Feb. 24, 2006,
§1, at 3.
98. Anthony M. DeStefano, The Body Snatchers: Funeral Home-Based Ring Charged, NEWSDAY,




102. Daryl Passmore, The Body Business, THE SUNDAY MAIL (Australia), July 1, 2006, at 57.
103. Mastromarino subsequently pled guilty to numerous charges of enterprise corruption, reckless
endangerment and body stealing in New York. Alan Feuer, Dentist Pleads Guilty to Stealing and
Selling Body Parts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2008, at B6. In Pennsylvania, he pled guilty to charges in-
volving his business arrangement with three Philadelphia morticians. Joseph A. Slobodzian, Body-parts
Mastermind Pleads Guilty, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 29, 2008, at B01.
104. In the spring of 2006, 1 was interviewed along with two surgeons for a nightly news program
in Chicago, Illinois. The doctors had transplanted possibly insalubrious tissues in patients here in Chi-
cago. The tissues were processed from a tissue bank now closed and under investigation by the attorney
general's office in New Jersey. The discovery that the tissue bank purloined body parts from a funeral
home was disclosed only after the surgeons implanted tissues from cadavers that may have carried
diseases or from individuals who died from cancer. Patients across the United States are now being
tested for hepatitis and other communicable diseases. Several lawsuits have been filed. See Chicago
Tonight (PBS television broadcast Feb. 2, 2006).
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tise, resources, and luxury (at the time of surgery) to perform sophisticated
microbial analyses on heart valves and tendons. Equally, anesthetized pa-
tients are unprepared to test or know that they should test the products pur-
chased from tissue banks before or during surgery and implantation. Thus,
placing the onus on patients and their physicians to be the gatekeepers to
these industries is simply unreasonable for purposes of public policy, par-
ticularly given that tissue banks are in the best position to test their own
products before placing them into the streams of commerce. Further, that
many tissue banks, including Cryolife, the source of much litigation, 105 are
for-profit, truly distinguishes the industry from not-for-profit blood proces-
sors such as the Red Cross. 106
It is here that the story of tissue giant, Cryolife, its litigation history,
clients' narratives, and setbacks are instructive for public policy analysis.
Despite lawsuit settlements against Cryolife, the Court of Appeals of Cali-
fornia determined in 2003 that Cryolife and arguably other tissue banks are
immune from liability for the body parts they place into the stream of
commerce. 107 According to the Court of Appeals of California, Cryolife's
immunity from placing insalubrious tissues in the marketplace arises from
the fact that buying, collecting, processing, storing, and selling body parts
are collectively and essentially a "service" and that the parts sold are not
"goods."1 08
The Cryolife holding invites scrutiny as to how body parts should be
classified and what their legal status ought to be. In facts similar to Model
C, Alan Minvielle sued the tissue bank after the allograft he received was
105. See, e.g., Cryolife Inc. v. Super. Ct., 110 Cal. App. 4th 1145, 1154-55 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)
(holding that tissue bank provided a service and not a product by collecting, storing, and selling body
parts); Talton v. Arnall Golden Gregory, LLP, 622 S.E.2d 589, 592-93 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (concluding
that injured patient failed to show that lawyers for Cryolife ever intended for their advice regarding
tissue warning labels to be disclosed to or relied on by third parties, or that, when lawyers consulted
with client corporation, they were "actually aware" that patients would rely on such confidential ad-
vice); In re Cryolife, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. I:02-CV-1868-BBM, 2003 U.S. Dist LEXIS 26170, at *36-
38 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (finding stock purchasers sufficiently alleged securities fraud by alleging that, after
a transplant recipient died from contaminated tissue provided by a corporation, the corporation misre-
presented its quality standards and compliance with regulations).
106. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) does not require companies to be a registered
member of a certified tissue bank association, such as the Tissue Bank Association of America
(TBAA). Rather, each company selects its own method for testing tissues, determining whether it will
test and treat tissues at all, and whether it will inform patients and physicians about the results of those
tests. Linda Bren, Keeping Human Tissue Transplants Safe, FDA CONSUMER MAG., May-June 2005,
available at http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2005/305_tissue.html (last visited May 1, 2008).
107. See Cryolife, 110 Cal. App. 4th at 1155 (concluding that the California Health and Safety
Code "provides statutory immunity from strict liability to tissue banks subject to regulation").
108. Id. ("By expressly deeming such activities to constitute a service, the Legislature must have
intended a tissue bank to be immune from strict liability, just like a pharmacy.").
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found to be contaminated by deadly bacteria. 109 The court's conclusion that
body parts are a service rather than the performance of a service precluded
his recovery and is a striking feature of the case. 1 10 It is a conclusion that is
hard to support; arguably few people would consider his or her knee, heart,
hip, or spine a service. Likewise, of course, tissue banks leery of litigation
are equally reluctant to treat knees as goods, which will expose them to
liability when contaminated cadaver tissues are placed into the stream of
commerce. This tension and incoherence in the law exposes the need for a
common lexicon and understanding of the legal and social status of cadaver
body parts and tissues. Arguably, in the changing function and use of body
parts, our common understanding of the parts' post-harvesting classifica-
tion should also evolve. In other words, what Cryolife processes describes
its service; what it produces through that processing is a good or product
for which it receives value.
The relevance of this point proved significant to the court's analysis of
the case and whether the plaintiff could pursue a strict liability claim for
punitive damages against the tissue bank. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals
of California was not persuaded by the plaintiff's charge that Cryolife did
not fit within the legislative exemption provided for blood banks. ' l' Cali-
fornia and a majority of states enacted blood shield immunity statutes dur-
ing the 1950s and throughout the subsequent two decades to shield
organizations that collected and processed blood from strict liability
claims. 112
CryoLife contended that the Health and Safety Code provisions of
California, which define the status of tissue banks, barred plaintiffs from
strict liability claims against tissue banks.11 3 The statute, however, does not
explicitly provide such an exemption or immunity to tissue banks. Rather,
section 1606, the codification of the blood shield law, provides in pertinent
part:
The procurement, processing, distribution, or use of whole blood, plas-
ma, blood products, and blood derivatives for the purpose of injecting or
transfusing the same, or any of them, into the human body shall be con-
strued to be, and is declared to be, for all purposes whatsoever, the rendi-
tion of a service by each and every person, firm, or corporation
participating therein. 114
109. Id. at 1148.
110. Id. at 1154-55.
111. Id. at 1153-54.
112. Id. at 1153.
113. Id. at 1153-54; see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1635.2 (West 2007).
114. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1606.
[Vol 84:1
EXPRESSIVE MINIMALISM AND FUZZY SIGNALS
The public policy rationale for blood shield laws was to promote an
adequate blood supply, particularly as most surgeries requiring blood are
not elective, but rather a matter of life and death. Thus, the policy militates
against liability in the absence of a negligent or intentional tort. Yet,
whether the same rationale should hold true for tissue banks is a different
matter.
Ultimately, the court agreed with CryoLife's nuanced definition of its
business. The tissue bank claimed that its business status, although for-
profit, is similar to that of blood banks-which traditionally have been not-
for-profit-within the definition of the blood shield immunity law. 115 Both
sections of the law (1606 and 1635.2) describe the banks as providing ser-
vices, however, only the blood shield statute provides an immunity provi-
sion-and only for blood banks. 116 Despite the "difference in language of
section 1606 and section 1635.2," 117 the court held that the legislature must
have intended to shield tissue banks from strict liability claims.
The court's analysis leaves much to be pondered considering its leap
is not supported by any legislative history or legislative comment, nor does
the court point to comment sections from the Health and Safety Code. In-
stead, the court offers that the legislature (in 1991) should have known or
predicted that in 2003 "tissue banks are paid for their activities in connec-
tion with providing human cadaver tissue for medical use" and thus must
have "intended tissue banks to be immune from strict liability."' 118 The
court errs here as the legislature instead would have been aware of the 1984
National Organ Transplantation Act, which prohibits the buying and selling
of body parts, including human tissues.
However, the court's effort to be guided by the legislature is under-
mined by fuzzy signaling.' 19 To explicate, the court extends immunity
protection to tissue banks when the statute that it relies upon fails on its
face to grant that type of protection to the industry. 120 By attempting to
express minimally, relying on settled law for blood banks-the court
reaches into its dusty handbag and unfolds a drape of immunity for tissue
banks. The court gives a new and unusual interpretation of the tissue bank
statute, which does not provide any immunity language, without an effort
to investigate or explain if the legislature actually intended for tissue banks
115. Cryolife, 110 Cal. App. 4th at 1150.
116. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1606.
117. Cryolife, 110 Cal. App. 4th at 1155.
118. Id.




to be immune from strict liability lawsuits. It is more common to look at
the legislative history, or at least to examine the record of the legislative
committee enacting the statute, when a case is under de novo review. Had
the court examined the legislative history of the blood bank statute and the
later tissue bank regulations, it might have discovered that the public policy
rationales for blood bank immunity were quite unique to that industry. 121
Unlike blood suppliers, tissue banks are a different business and social
concept. While some tissue banks supply heart valves, others focus on
cosmetic services, such as products to enhance lips, penis size, cheekbones,
and other non-essential elective medical products. Moreover, the technolo-
gy is available for highly sophisticated testing of tissues before they enter
the stream of commerce, unlike the developing science of blood testing in
the 1950s (when immunity statutes were first drafted). The Cryolife court's
fuzzy rule-making leads one only to guess what other industries would
qualify for immunity simply because they provide a medical service. The
court too easily dismissed the plaintiff's claim that he received a defective
product and not a service. Minvielle's surgeon successfully implanted a
contaminated body part. The service received was perfectly fine. The prod-
uct was the problem. The court made a significant error in expanding the
protection of blood shield statutes (promulgated over forty years prior)
122
to an industry neither so altruistic, nor anticipated by state legislatures in
the 1950s and 60s. Ironically, the court concludes its dismissal of the plain-
tiffs strict liability claim against a tissue bank by quoting from an earlier
blood shield law case, Hyland Therapeutics v. Superior Court,123 to sup-
port its rationale that the California legislature intended for blood banks to
be free from fault:
We concur in the perception that "legislatures have determined that the
production and use of human blood and its derivatives for therapeutic
purposes should be encouraged; and for this purpose those who provide
these products, and who are themselves free from fault, should not be re-
121. Blood banks in the 1950s were mostly not-for-profit and often connected with hospitals.
Legislatures treated the collection, processing, storage, and administration of blood as a service and not
as a sale subject to warranty because blood banks were organized around altruistic principles, which
were consistent with their not-for-profit status. The legislative intent was to promote the procurement of
blood and protect blood banks from the possibility of frivolous (and more serious) lawsuits. Blood
supply was vital as a domestic and military issue given cold war aggressions and wars in Korea and
later Vietnam. Blood banks were not in the position to warrant the quality of blood that donors provided
despite the fact that they processed, transported, and administered blood; they were limited by the
available science at the time. Nor was the technology available to perform sophisticated blood analyses.
Thus viruses transfused through blood were often undetectable during this era.
122. See PAUL SCHMIDT, THE NATIONAL BLOOD POLICY: A STUDY IN THE POLITICS OF HEALTH,
(2004), available at http://www.hhs.gov/bloodsafety/presentationsNationalBloodPolicyStudy.pdf.
123. 175 Cal. App. 3d 509 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
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quired to bear the economic loss which might otherwise be imposed un-
der the rules of strict liability which are applicable to sellers of
cial products generally." 124
V. WHO OWNS THE BODY
Courts have seemingly left the rapidly expanding field of biotechnolo-
gy and the relevant legal questions resulting from its enormous grasp to be
decided by narrow past holdings that predate the scientific revolution of the
past fifteen years. Expressive minimalism on the bench offers no guidance
as to how we should understand the body or its legal status. There are sev-
eral by-products of this unresponsiveness. First, there is a stunted lexicon in
how society comes to define biotechnology and its interactions with it.
Incompatible concepts and misleading jargon describe new and distinctive-
ly different practices. Surely when a hospital sells a placenta to a cosmetic
company it is not a "donation" from the mother, nor is it a "gift" from its
biological "parent" or the third party hospital.
Second, our failure to effectively grapple with supply issues in bio-
technology has hurt our ability to adequately supply the resources in great
demand, especially organs. Congress remains wedded to the notion that
organs are only to be altruistically acquired. It is no wonder then that nearly
99,000 Americans wait for organs on transplant waitlists. Over seven thou-
sand will die this year, while on the US transplant lists.
Lastly, how do we make sense of the human body when it has been
commodified? Here, we need not imagine the future, but simply deal with
the reality in front of us. Each year there are over one million allograft
surgeries performed in the United States. However, when bones are har-
vested from cadavers and sold to biotech companies, which later resell the
refurbished bone to hospitals and dentists, how should we refer to these
tissues and transactions? Are they licensed goods, stolen goods, property,
products, possessions (borrowed vessels belonging to the state or god), life
estates, or a service? Or combinations? Each term has meaning and implies
social values, cultural understandings and legal statuses, each of which is
significant to judicial interpretation.
Historically, the body has been contested as property. That history is
well documented from a socio-historical perspective, and more recently by
the brilliant work of Harriet Washington as a matter of medical inquiry and
interpretation. If the body were to be redefined as property, it might con-
124. Cryolife, 10 Cal. App. 4th at 1156.
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flict with a broader social understanding that the body is a sacred, inaliena-
ble object. 125 For some scholars the question posed might be a false one-
the property interest they might suggest is not in the body itself, but in the
right to the body. In other words, some scholars contend that we do not
own our bodies; we simply have a right to use them while we live. And
some scholars, like Lior Strahilevitz, consider the question moot altogeth-
er-they are more concerned with more novel questions, including the right
to destroy, limit, and exhaust. For them, perhaps we are already over the
threshold of the post-commodification and absolute property world.
Equally, without a legal status, the body is also vulnerable to the un-
remedied exploitation of others. 126 You can steal a body part-Michael
Mastromarino who engineered a mafia-like organization that purloined
body parts from thousands of cadavers has proven that. But is a body part,
such as a bone, still stolen after its implantation? Giving a tendon back to
its rightful owner or her estate might seem an uncomplicated question.
Some economists might view it as wealth-maximizing to simply allow the
new possessor to "keep it." But does the possessor truly own it? If gold was
unwittingly and nonconsensually extracted from one patient's mouth and
implanted into another, would there not be a financial remedy and possibly
criminal penalty? If this question were expanded to other valuable consid-
erations, such as cars and homes, the answers would be far more obvious
and much less dubious.
The assumptions that crowded our understandings about the human
body, including that it lacked value, no longer make sense because those
conceptions are no longer true, valid or grounded in fact. What we now
know are simply inconvenient truths; a human cadaver is worth over
$250,000. It matters not that its owner must negotiate with others to realize
that value as the same is true each time an estate is prepared for probate and
auction. For example, tendons have a financial value, as do bones, heart
valves, and corneas. It would be inconvenient to remove a purloined tendon
from its new host, but we risk promoting fiction if we describe such an
implant as a gift or donation. But more importantly, legal scholars and
judges will fail to anticipate second and third generation policy questions
125. See Radin, supra note 33, at 1851 ("In conceiving of all rights as property rights that can (at
least theoretically) be alienated in markets, economic analysis has.., invited us to view all inalienabili-
ties as problematic.").
126. See, e.g., Judith D. Fischer, Misappropriation of Human Eggs and Embryos and the Tort of
Conversion: A Relational View, 32 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 381, 381 (1999) (noting that "[a]s technological
breakthroughs change the world, old legal theories may seem inadequate to address new legal prob-
lems.").
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by pretending that the human body lacks value and failing to develop the
contours of a new approach to defining the human body.
Maybe, as property, a legitimate claim of ownership can be made, and
the ability to redress nonconsensual appropriation is better established. 
127 If
the body exists only for the purpose of carrying our souls and it is violated,
it would seem that whatever cause of action that might exist is not one to be
adjudicated in courts of law.
A determination of whether the body is property might influence the
outcome of several cases currently in litigation or offer a compelling chal-
lenge to those recently decided, including whether heart valves and tissues
used for donation are products, whether universities have a property claim
or proprietary interest in research subjects' DNA and tissues, the constitu-
tionality of body part conscription laws, and whether causes of action can
be sustained for wrongful implantation, directed implantation, and likely a
host of other foreseeable and also unimaginable problems. This determina-
tion will be a significant factor in future product liability claims.
The models discussed in this essay demonstrate that entrenched mi-
nimal expressionism in a rapidly expanding biotechnological era will un-
dermine the growth and meaningful development of common law
jurisprudence on the ownership, dispensation, and remedies involving body
parts. Without judicial adaptation to an evolving society in which litigation
involves body parts, plaintiffs will never prevail. 128 A common element of
the three very different scenarios presented in the above models is that
absent a finding that deems the body as self ownership or "property," plain-
tiffs will be barred from recovery-even in the more disturbing cases that
involve the most egregious breaches of medical trust and ethics.
CONCLUSION
Formalistic rule making will run counter to reasoned, evolved deci-
sion-making. By taking the paths of least resistance, courts will undermine
the legitimacy and integrity of the bench by failing to acknowledge and
respond to shifting cultural norms, trends, social behaviors, and biotech-
127. Id. at 402-03 (advocating a torts conversion remedy for patient-victims in order to make them
whole again).
128. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 480 (Cal. 1990) (a case of first
impression, rejecting conversion claims for nonconsensual use of cells to develop a valuable patent).
The majority pointed out that Moore failed to cite a decision supporting his argument that the excised
spleen and cell line were property. Id. at 489 n.28 ("No party has cited a decision supporting Moore's
argument that excised cells are 'a species of tangible personal property capable of being converted."').
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nology. 129 More importantly, the presumption that legislatures are actively
watching, planning, and responding to fuzzy signals does not pan out in the
cases presented, or as a general rule. Courts have the capacity to intervene
when the democratic process becomes captured by majoritarian or minori-
tarian interests. Formalistic rule-making, according to the Honorable Mary
Schroeder, is to devise "pontifical formulas which relieve [courts] of the
burden of reasoned decisionmaking." 130
Judges tend to view biotechnology cases involving body parts episodi-
cally and not collectively. 131 They value the risks of reoccurrence, and
make two incorrect assumptions. The first assumption is that the tortuous
conduct in these instances is isolated. The second false assumption is that
legislatures will provide the equitable remedies for plaintiffs in biotech
disputes. What is missed in the latter assumption is that plaintiffs' litigation
would more than likely be settled outside of the judiciary process if legisla-
tors were paying attention to these issues.
Judicial minimalists necessarily ignore exogenous sources, instead
choosing to concentrate on adhering to traditional norms, 132 lest they be
viewed as unmindful of their role, radical or even judicially activist. In
essence, judges do not believe it is their role to change the law to respond
to biotechnology. Yet, rather than clarifying the law, a fuzzy picture devel-
ops. Intuitively, even the least sophisticated judges realize that contempo-
rary landscapes in biotechnology do not match or correspond to valleys and
fields of yesteryears. The minimalists' pallet constricts them to paint desert
129. As even Moore illuminates, what was previously considered medical waste and ordered to be
incinerated (even by state statute) is now a patentable good. See id. at 491.
130. Hon. Mary M. Schroeder, Appellate Justice Today: Fairness or Formulas The Fairchild
Lecture, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 9, 9-10.
131. See Georgia Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127, 129 (Ga. 1985) (opining that
"[c]ertainly, the General Assembly has it within its power, in the interest of the public welfare, to
authorize this procedure, which yearly benefits hundreds of Georgians."). For an explanation of the
Georgia Lions Eye Bank decision, see Welch v. Welch, 505 S.E.2d 470, 472 (Ga. 1998). In addition,
the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Georgia Lions Eye Bank has been cited by numerous courts.
See, e.g., Brotherton v. Cleveland, No. 91-3316, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 15947, at *9 (6th Cir. June 30,
1992); Perry v. Saint Francis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 886 F. Supp. 1551, 1563 (D. Kan. 1995); Moore v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 215 Cal. App. 3d 709 (Ct. App 1988); State v. Powell, 497 So.2d 1188,
1194 n.4 (Fla. 1986); State v. Moseley, 436 S.E.2d 632, 634 (Ga. 1993); Schneider v. Susquehanna
Radio Corp., 581 S.E.2d 603, 608 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003); Bauer v N. Fulton Med. Ctr., Inc., 527 S.E.2d
240, 243-44 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999); Alternative Health Care Sys., Inc. v. McCown, 514 S.E.2d 691, 695
(Ga. Ct. App. 1999). The Georgia Lions Eye Bank has also been cited by courts in a number of dissent-
ing opinions. See, e.g., Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 483 (6th Cir. 1991); Jackson v. State,
430 S.E.2d 781, 788 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). Criticized in Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786,
796 (9th Cir. 2002); Mansaw v. Midwest Organ Bank, No. 97-0271-CV-W-6, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10307, at *15 (W.D. Mo. July 8, 1998).
132. Guido Calabresi, An Introduction to Legal Thought: Four Approaches to Law and to the
Allocation of Body Parts, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2113, 2115 (2003).
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scapes for water-drenched valleys and gardens where there are now toxic
landfills.
Minimalists would argue that it is the legislature's role to introduce
new meaning to the law; the courts simply sort out the statutory "mish-
mash." 133 Guido Calabresi suggests that the formalist approach "does not
contemplate the introduction of new or modified values into the scheme as
part of the[ir] role."' 134 Thus the court's function to hear the new biotech-
nology cases with an objective ear is usurped not by judicial indifference to
plaintiffs, but rather a defense "of the values it finds embedded in the sys-
tem." 135 In strictly adhering to minimal expressionism, judges ignore the
independence of the bench and its secondary function, which is to sort out
the mishmash. Obsequious loyalty to doctrine necessarily inures heightened
blindness to external factors, and in the face of biotechnological harms to
plaintiffs, may undermine the perception of the judiciary as an independent,
fair, and competent arm of the government.
Although Calabresi suggests that today's formalists "make a bow to
exogenous values,"'136 Models A-C (and there are many more) do not sup-
port that conclusion. Rather, the refusal to tamper with almost biblically
derived notions of the body by introducing new values, recognizing alterna-
tive paradigms and hermeneutics, suffocates the law. Thus, while the law
of body parts could be a robust representation of nuanced thinking on a
very complex issue, instead it appears weak, ragged, and arbitrary.
Courts should not abstain from pushing into new territory or fashion-
ing new law "simply because another court has not yet so held or because
the Legislature has not yet addressed the question."' 137 Judicial action is
neither preconditioned nor proscribed by the behavior of the legislature,
especially where constitutional rights are at stake, nor by prior precedent in
other jurisdictions. In the common law system, the primary instruments for
clarity and expression are the courts. Precedent is often a sound guide;
however, the common law need not be hostage to its past.
133. See, e.g., Moore, 793 P.2d at 493 (noting that "it is inappropriate to impose liability for con-
version based upon the allegations of Moore's complaint [because] problems in this area are better
suited to legislative resolution").
134. See Calabresi, supra note 132, at 2115-16 (explaining four dominant legal schools of thought:
doctrinalism or autonomism, "law and..., legal process school, and law and status).
135. Id. at 2116.
136. Id. at 2117.
137. Moore, 793 P.2d at 507 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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